

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN  
SOUTHERN DIVISION**

**MICHAEL PRIMEAU,**

**Plaintiff,**

**CIVIL ACTION NO. 13-cv-12849**

**vs.**

**DISTRICT JUDGE ROBERT H. CLELAND**

**COMMISSIONER OF  
SOCIAL SECURITY,**

**MAGISTRATE JUDGE MONA K. MAJZOUN**

**Defendant.**

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**REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION**

Plaintiff Darin Boettcher seeks judicial review of Defendant the Commissioner of Society Security's determination that he is not entitled to social security benefits for his physical and mental impairments under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Docket no. 1.) Before the Court are Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (docket no. 8) and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (docket no. 10). The motions have been referred to the undersigned for a report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). (Docket no. 2.) The Court has reviewed the pleadings, dispenses with a hearing pursuant to Eastern district of Michigan Local Rule 7.1(f)(2), and issues this Report and Recommendation.

**I. RECOMMENDATION:**

The undersigned recommends that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (docket no. 8) be DENIED and that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (docket no. 10) be GRANTED.

**II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY:**

Plaintiff filed applications for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income with protective filing dates of October 21, 2010, alleging that he had been disabled since January 17, 2009, due to diabetes-related symptoms. (*See* TR 20.) The Social Security Administration denied benefits, and Plaintiff requested a *de novo* hearing, which was held on October 3, 2011, before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Elliot Bunce, who subsequently found that Plaintiff was not entitled to benefits because he was capable of performing a significant number of jobs in the national economy. (TR 20-27.) The Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ's decision, and Plaintiff commenced this action for judicial review. The parties then filed their instant Motions.

### **III. PLAINTIFF'S TESTIMONY, MEDICAL EVIDENCE, AND VOCATIONAL EXPERT'S TESTIMONY**

#### **A. Plaintiff's Testimony and the Medical Evidence of Record**

In his brief, Plaintiff sets forth a short procedural history of this matter and discusses the ALJ's basis for denying his benefits. (Docket no. 8 at 5.) Notably, Plaintiff's brief fails to contain a single reference to the medical record. (*See* docket no. 8.) Further, Plaintiff's discussion of his testimony is limited to the following:

The claimant testified at the hearing that he was not able to hold a steady job due to the fact that he has to check his blood sugars every two hours. (Tr. 45) Additionally, in the past, because he was not able to check his blood sugars, he was a danger to the general public while performing his delivery driving position. (Tr. 45) If he does not keep it in check, he could have seizures and even black out. (Tr. 43)

(Docket no. 8 at 9.) Defendant asserts that "[t]he ALJ adequately presented Plaintiff's testimony and the medical evidence in this case." (Docket no. 10 at 5; *see also* TR 24.) The undersigned has reviewed the hearing transcript and Plaintiff's medical record, but for the reasons discussed *infra*, it is unnecessary to summarize them herein. Therefore, Plaintiff's medical record and testimony as

set forth in the ALJ's decision (TR 24-25) and Plaintiff's brief (Docket no. 8 at 9) are adopted; the undersigned will incorporate comments and citations as necessary throughout this Report and Recommendation.

### **C. Vocational Expert's Testimony**

After asking the VE to discuss Plaintiff's past work experience, the ALJ asked the VE to consider a hypothetical individual with the same age, education, and work experience as Plaintiff. (TR 53-54.) He told the VE to assume that this individual

is able to perform work that does not require exertion above the light level, that does not expose the worker to hazards such as heights, dangerous machinery or driving, and that does consist of no more than simple, routine, repetitious tasks with one- or two-step instructions, and that does not include what I would call strict production quotas, meaning the requirement to complete a specified number of unites of work in a specified period of time.

(TR 49.) The VE testified that such an individual could perform work as a cashier, a general office clerk, or an information clerk. (TR 49.)

The ALJ then asked the VE to explain how an individual's need to regularly check his blood-sugar levels would impact his ability to perform one of these jobs. The VE testified that an individual could perform work as a general office clerk or information clerk if he could check his blood-sugar levels at his workstation or in any of the three positions if he would not be required to leave his workstation for more than five minutes each hour. (TR 50-51.) Plaintiff's representative declined the opportunity to question the VE. (TR 51.)

### **IV. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S DETERMINATION**

The ALJ found that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Act through December 31, 2014, and that he had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since June 2, 2009. (TR 22.) The ALJ then found that Plaintiff suffered from severe diabetes. (TR 22-23.) The ALJ

further found that Plaintiff's impairments did not meet or equal one of the listed impairments. (TR 23.)

The ALJ then determined that Plaintiff had the following residual functional capacity:

[C]laimant has the residual functional capacity to perform work that does not require: exertion above the light level . . . ; or exposure to hazards, such as heights, dangerous machinery, or driving; or more than simple, routine, repetitious tasks, with one- or two-step instructions; or strict production quotas, defined as the requirement to produce a specified number of units of work in a specified period of time.

(TR 23-25.) Then, in reliance on the VE's testimony, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could not perform any of his past relevant work, but he could perform a significant number of jobs in the national economy; therefore, he was not disabled from January 17, 2009, through the date of the ALJ's decision. (TR 26-27.)

## **V. LAW AND ANALYSIS**

### **A. Standard of Review**

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner's final decisions. Judicial review of the Commissioner's decisions is limited to determining whether his findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether he employed the proper legal standards. *See Richardson v. Perales*, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); *Walters v. Comm'r*, 127 F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." *Richardson*, 402 U.S. at 401 (quoting *Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB*, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); *Walters*, 127 F.3d at 528. It is not the function of this Court to try cases *de novo*, resolve conflicts in the evidence, or decide questions of credibility. *See Brainard v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs.*, 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989); *Garner v. Heckler*, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984).

In determining the existence of substantial evidence, the court must examine the

administrative record as a whole. *See Kirk v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs.*, 667 F.2d 524, 536 (6th Cir. 1981), *cert. denied*, 461 U.S. 957 (1983). If the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, it must be affirmed, even if the reviewing court would decide the matter differently, *Kinsella v. Schweiker*, 708 F.2d 1058, 1059 (6th Cir. 1983), and even if substantial evidence also supports the opposite conclusion. *See Her v. Comm’r*, 203 F.3d 388, 389-90 (6th Cir. 1999); *Mullen v. Bowen*, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (noting that the substantial evidence standard “presupposes that there is a zone of choice within which the decisionmakers can go either way, without interference by the courts”).

#### **B. Framework for Social Security Determinations**

Plaintiff’s Social Security disability determination was made in accordance with a five-step sequential analysis. In the first four steps, Plaintiff was required to show that:

- (1) Plaintiff was not presently engaged in substantial gainful employment; and
- (2) Plaintiff suffered from a severe impairment; and
- (3) the impairment met or was medically equal to a “listed impairment;” or
- (4) Plaintiff did not have the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform relevant past work.

*See* 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)-(f). If Plaintiff’s impairments prevented Plaintiff from doing past work, the Commissioner, at step five, would consider Plaintiff’s RFC, age, education, and past work experience to determine if Plaintiff could perform other work. If not, Plaintiff would be deemed disabled. *See id.* at § 404.1520(g). The Commissioner has the burden of proof only on “the fifth step, proving that there is work available in the economy that the claimant can perform.” *Her*, 203 F.3d at 391. To meet this burden, the Commissioner must make a finding “supported by substantial evidence that [the claimant] has the vocational qualifications to perform specific jobs.” *Varley v.*

*Sec’y of Health and Human Servs.*, 820 F.2d 777, 779 (6th Cir. 1987). This “substantial evidence” may be in the form of vocational expert testimony in response to a hypothetical question, “but only ‘if the question accurately portrays [the claimant’s] individual physical and mental impairments.’” *Id.* (citations omitted).

### **C. Analysis**

The Social Security Act authorizes “two types of remand: (1) a post judgment remand in conjunction with a decision affirming, modifying, or reversing a decision of the [Commissioner] (a sentence-four remand); and (2) a pre-judgment remand for consideration of new and material evidence that for good cause was not previously presented to the [Commissioner] (a sentence-six remand).” *Faucher v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs.*, 17 F.3d 171, 174 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Under a sentence-four remand, the Court has the authority to “enter upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, denying, or reversing the decision of the [Commissioner], with or without remanding the cause for a hearing. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Where there is insufficient support for the ALJ’s findings, “the appropriate remedy is reversal and a sentence-four remand for further consideration.” *Morgan v. Astrue*, 10-207, 2011 WL 2292305, at \*8 (E.D.Ky. June 8, 2011) (citing *Faucher*, 17 F.3d at 174). Plaintiff argues that this matter should be reversed or remanded under sentence four because “the Commissioner erred as a matter of law in failing to properly evaluate the medical records and opinions of evidence, and thereby, formed an inaccurate hypothetical that did not accurately portray [Plaintiff’s] impairments.” (Docket no. 8 at 6.) In passing, Plaintiff also states that “the [ALJ’s] reasoning to support his lack of credibility is not substantiated.” (*Id.* at 10.)

To the extent Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in the formulation of the hypothetical questions presented to the VE, the ALJ is only required to incorporate in his hypothetical questions

those limitations that he finds credible and supported by the record. *See Casey v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs.*, 987 F.2d 1230, 1235 (6th Cir. 1993). Here, the ALJ’s hypothetical questions presented all of the limitations included in Plaintiff’s RFC—that is, all of the limitations that the ALJ found credible. The VE testified that there are jobs available for a person with these limitations. Thus, the ALJ’s hypothetical questions were not improper, and in substance, Plaintiff’s motion asserts that the ALJ erred in determining Plaintiff’s RFC when he failed to properly evaluate the medical opinions.

Plaintiff’s argument fails as his entire discussion of this matter is limited to several pages of legal standards and a few vague references to his own testimony. (*See* docket no. 8.) Plaintiff does not discuss why he believes the ALJ erred, what medical records or opinions or evidence the ALJ failed to properly consider,<sup>1</sup> or what additional impairments the ALJ allegedly failed to include in his hypothetical questions to the VE. As the Court addressed in a similar matter wherein Plaintiff’s counsel filed an almost identical brief, any additional analysis “is an exercise left to the reader; . . . Plaintiff’s summary judgment brief lack[s] any survey, much less meaningful discussion, of the medical record, and Plaintiff likewise fail[s] to provide any factual basis for h[er] challenge to the ALJ’s assessment of h[er] credibility.” *Fielder v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.*, No. 13-10325, 2014 WL 1207865, \*1 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 24, 2014) (Rosen, J.).

As Chief Judge Rosen noted in *Fielder*, this is not the first time the Court has denied a motion filed by Plaintiff’s counsel for “reliance on conclusory assertions and absence of developed argument;” indeed, “nearly every Magistrate Judge in this District has expressed this concern with the work product of Plaintiff’s counsel.” *Id.* at \*1 n.1 (collecting cases). Moreover, the Court

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<sup>1</sup>Significantly, the ALJ noted that in this matter that “[t]here are no treating or examining medical source opinions exhibited in the record.” (TR 25.)

warned Plaintiff's counsel that "this Court will carefully examine his submissions in future suits to ensure that they advance properly supported arguments that rest upon (and cite to) the facts of a particular case" and that failure to do so may result in either sanctions or referral for disciplinary proceedings. *Id.*

The undersigned has carefully examined Plaintiff's counsel's submission and finds it thoroughly deficient and devoid of proper factual substance and legal analysis. Plaintiff's counsel's superficial, cut-and-paste, template approach to fulfilling his professional duty to substantively brief the issues presented for this Court's most serious consideration and determination fails to comply with all accepted rules of civil pleading and practice in this District. The Court acknowledges that counsel may reduce costs and improve efficiency by using and inserting previously generated work product, such as any relevant applicable legal standards and specific rules. But Plaintiff's counsel's repeated failure to set forth factually specific, discernable, sound legal analyses in his briefing to this Court compels the waiver of any such arguments. *See Kennedy v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.*, 87 Fed.Appx. 464, 466 (E.D. Mich. 2003) ("[I]ssues which are 'adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived.'" *United States v. Elder*, 90 F.3d 1110, 1118 (6th Cir.1996)). The "'court is under no obligation to scour the record for errors not identified by [the] claimant.'" *Bush v. Astrue*, No. 12-11790, 2013 WL 1747807, \*14 (E.D. Mich. Jan 25, 2013) (Grand, M.J.) (quoting *Martinez v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.*, No. 09-13700 (E.D.Mich. Mar. 2, 2011)).

Therefore, Plaintiff's Motion should be denied. Any consideration of an award of sanctions against Plaintiff's counsel in this case would be inappropriate as the instant Motion was filed prior to Chief Judge Rosen's decision in *Fielder*.

## V. CONCLUSION



For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (docket no. 8) should be DENIED, and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (docket no. 10) should be GRANTED.

### **REVIEW OF REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION**

Either party to this action may object to and seek review of this Report and Recommendation, but must act within fourteen (14) days of service of a copy hereof as provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d)(2). Failure to file specific objections constitutes a waiver of any further right of appeal. *Thomas v. Arn*, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); *Howard v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs.*, 932 F.2d 505 (6th Cir. 1991); *United States v. Walters*, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). Filing objections which raise some issues but fail to raise others with specificity will not preserve all objections that a party might have to this Report and Recommendation. *Willis v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs.*, 931 F.2d 390, 401 (6th Cir. 1991); *Smith v. Detroit Fed'n of Teachers Local 231*, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987). Pursuant to Rule 72.1(d)(2) of the *Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan*, a copy of any objection must be served upon this Magistrate Judge.

Within fourteen (14) days of service of any objecting party's timely filed objections, the opposing party may file a response. The response shall be not more than five (5) pages in length unless by motion and order such page limit is extended by the Court. The response shall address specifically, and in the same order raised, each issue contained within the objections.

Dated: June 24, 2014

s/ Mona K. Majzoub  
 MONA K. MAJZOUB  
 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

**PROOF OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that a copy of this Report and Recommendation was served upon Counsel of Record on this date.

Dated: June 24, 2014

s/ Lisa C. Bartlett  
Case Manager